Relationship between Political Science and Philosophy
Political Science Courses (POLI). Undergraduate · An Introduction to Political Theory · Gender and International Relations. A political spectrum is a system of classifying different political positions upon one or more Political scientists have frequently noted that a single left–right axis is insufficient for . Despite the difference in methodology, location and theory, the results While Eysenck was an opponent of Nazism, his relationship with fascist. The chart said the light on the port side should blink every 4 seconds, .. in examining the relationship between human rights and economic fairness.” What was left out, however, was economics—even though I argued in.
Therefore, instead of classifying all political opinion on a one-dimensional range from left to right, Nolan's chart allowed two-dimensional measurement: Nolan said that one of the impacts of his chart is that when someone views it, it causes an irreversible change as viewers henceforth view the included orientations in two dimensions instead of one.
It resembles a square divided into five sections, with a label assigned to each of the following sections: Bottom left — Statism.
The opposite of libertarianism, corresponding with those supporting low economic and personal freedom. Those supporting low economic freedom and high personal freedom. Bottom right — Right-wing political philosophies. Those supporting high economic freedom and low personal freedom.Plato - Western Political Thought - part 1 - Philosophy & Political Science optional - UPSC
Top right — Libertarians. David Nolan's own philosophy, corresponding with those supporting high economic and personal freedom. The center area defines the political middle, for those who favor a mixed system balancing both economic and personal freedom with the need for some market regulation and personal sacrifice. Polling[ edit ] In Augustthe libertarian Reason magazine worked with the Rupe organization to survey 1, Americans by telephone and place their views within the Nolan chart categories.
The Reason-Rupe poll found that "Americans cannot easily be bundled into either the 'liberal' or 'conservative' groups". November Click [show] for important translation instructions. Machine translation like Deepl or Google Translate is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Wikipedia.
While Eysenck's R-factor is easily identified as the classical "left—right" dimension, the T-factor representing a factor drawn at right angles to the R-factor is less intuitive, as high-scorers favored pacifismracial equalityreligious education and restrictions on abortionwhile low-scorers had attitudes more friendly to militarismharsh punishmenteasier divorce laws and companionate marriage.
Despite the difference in methodologylocation and theorythe results attained by Eysenck and Ferguson matched. Simply rotating Eysenck's two factors 45 degrees renders the same factors of religionism and humanitarianism identified by Ferguson in America. Eysenck was an outspoken opponent of what he perceived as the authoritarian abuses of the left and right and accordingly he believed that with this T axis he had found the link between nazism and communism.
According to Eysenck, members of both ideologies were tough-minded. Central to Eysenck's thesis was the claim that tender-minded ideologies were democratic and friendly to human freedomswhile tough-minded ideologies were aggressive and authoritariana claim that is open to political criticism.
In this context, Eysenck carried out studies on nazism and communist groups, claiming to find members of both groups to be more "dominant" and more "aggressive" than control groups.
Eysenck himself lent theoretical support to the English National Party which also opposed "Hitlerite" Nazism and was interviewed in the first issue of their journal The Beacon in relation to his controversial views on relative intelligence between different races. The interpretation of tough-mindedness as a manifestation of "authoritarian" versus tender-minded "democratic" values was incompatible with the Frankfurt school 's single-axis modelwhich conceptualized authoritarianism as being a fundamental manifestation of conservatism and many researchers took issue with the idea of "left-wing authoritarianism".
This abstract dimension may or may not correspond to a real material phenomenon and obvious problems arise when it is applied to human psychology. The second factor in such an analysis such as Eysenck's T-factor is the second best explanation for the spread of the data, which is by definition drawn at right angles to the first factor. While the first factor, which describes the bulk of the variation in a set of data, is more likely to represent something objectively real, subsequent factors become more and more abstract.
Such a construct would be expected to appear in factor analysis whether or not it corresponded to something real, thus rendering Eysenck's thesis unfalsifiable through factor analysis. Eysenck's work, Milton Rokeach developed his own two-axis model of political values inbasing this on the ideas of freedom and equalitywhich he described in his book, The Nature of Human Values.
One cannot overestimate the extent to which Pitkin has shaped contemporary understandings of political representation, especially among political scientists. For example, her claim that descriptive representation opposes accountability is often the starting point for contemporary discussions about whether marginalized groups need representatives from their groups.
In particular, there has been a lot of theoretical attention paid to the proper design of representative institutions e. Amy ; Barber, ; Christiano ; Guinier In this way, theoretical discussions of political representation tend to depict political representation as primarily a principal-agent relationship.
The emphasis on elections also explains why discussions about the concept of political representation frequently collapse into discussions of democracy.
Political representation is understood as a way of 1 establishing the legitimacy of democratic institutions and 2 creating institutional incentives for governments to be responsive to citizens.
David Plotke has noted that this emphasis on mechanisms of authorization and accountability was especially useful in the context of the Cold War. For this understanding of political representation specifically, its demarcation from participatory democracy was useful for distinguishing Western democracies from Communist countries. Those political systems that held competitive elections were considered to be democratic Schumpeter Plotke questions whether such a distinction continues to be useful.
Plotke recommends that we broaden the scope of our understanding of political representation to encompass interest representation and thereby return to debating what is the proper activity of representatives.
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For this reason, those who attempt to define political representation should recognize how changing political realities can affect contemporary understandings of political representation.
Again, following Pitkin, ideas about political representation appear contingent on existing political practices of representation. Our understandings of representation are inextricably shaped by the manner in which people are currently being represented. Changing Political Realities and Changing Concepts of Political Representation As mentioned earlier, theoretical discussions of political representation have focused mainly on the formal procedures of authorization and accountability within nation states, that is, on what Pitkin called formalistic representation.
However, such a focus is no longer satisfactory due to international and domestic political transformations. So, as the powers of nation-state have been disseminated to international and transnational actors, elected representatives are not necessarily the agents who determine how policies are implemented.
Given these changes, the traditional focus of political representation, that is, on elections within nation-states, is insufficient for understanding how public policies are being made and implemented. The complexity of modern representative processes and the multiple locations of political power suggest that contemporary notions of accountability are inadequate.
Grant and Keohane have recently updated notions of accountability, suggesting that the scope of political representation needs to be expanded in order to reflect contemporary realities in the international arena. Michael Saward has proposed an innovative type of criteria that should be used for evaluating non-elective representative claims. John Dryzek and Simon Niemayer has proposed an alternative conception of representation, what he calls discursive representation, to reflect the fact that transnational actors represent discourses, not real people.
Domestic transformations also reveal the need to update contemporary understandings of political representation. Associational life — social movements, interest groups, and civic associations—is increasingly recognized as important for the survival of representative democracies. The extent to which interest groups write public policies or play a central role in implementing and regulating policies is the extent to which the division between formal and informal representation has been blurred.
The fluid relationship between the career paths of formal and informal representatives also suggests that contemporary realities do not justify focusing mainly on formal representatives. Given these changes, it is necessary to revisit our conceptual understanding of political representation, specifically of democratic representation.
For as Jane Mansbridge has recently noted, normative understandings of representation have not kept up with recent empirical research and contemporary democratic practices.
Promissory representation is a form of representation in which representatives are to be evaluated by the promises they make to constituents during campaigns. For both are primarily concerned with the ways that constituents give their consent to the authority of a representative.
Drawing on recent empirical work, Mansbridge argues for the existence of three additional forms of representation. In anticipatory representation, representatives focus on what they think their constituents will reward in the next election and not on what they promised during the campaign of the previous election. Thus, anticipatory representation challenges those who understand accountability as primarily a retrospective activity. Finally, surrogate representation occurs when a legislator represents constituents outside of their districts.
For Mansbridge, each of these different forms of representation generates a different normative criterion by which representatives should be assessed. All four forms of representation, then, are ways that democratic citizens can be legitimately represented within a democratic regime. Yet none of the latter three forms representation operates through the formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability.
Recently, Mansbridge has gone further by suggesting that political science has focused too much on the sanctions model of accountability and that another model, what she calls the selection model, can be more effective at soliciting the desired behavior from representatives. According to Mansbridge, a sanction model of accountability presumes that the representative has different interests from the represented and that the represented should not only monitor but reward the good representative and punish the bad.
In this way, Mansbridge broadens our understanding of accountability to allow for good representation to occur outside of formal sanctioning mechanisms. By specifying the different forms of representation within a democratic polity, Mansbridge teaches us that we should refer to the multiple forms of democratic representation.
Democratic representation should not be conceived as a monolithic concept. Moreover, what is abundantly clear is that democratic representation should no longer be treated as consisting simply in a relationship between elected officials and constituents within her voting district.
Political representation should no longer be understood as a simple principal-agent relationship. Andrew Rehfeld has gone farther, maintaining that political representation should no longer be territorially based. In other words, Rehfeld argues that constituencies, e. In response to this dilemma, Disch proposes a mobilization conception of political representation and develops a systemic understanding of reflexivity as the measure of its legitimacy.
For Saward, representation entails a series of relationships: For this reason, the represented should have the ultimate say in judging the claims of the representative. The task of the representative is to create claims that will resonate with appropriate audiences. Saward therefore does not evaluate representatives by the extent to which they advance the preferences or interests of the represented.
Instead he focuses on the institutional and collective conditions in which claim-making takes place. The constructivist turn examines the conditions for claim-making, not the activities of particular representatives. This standpoint does not mean taking at face value whomever or whatever citizens regard as representing them. Contemporary Advances There have been a number of important advances in theorizing the concept of political representation.
In particular, these advances call into question the traditional way of thinking of political representation as a principal-agent relationship.
She explains each aspect by using a corresponding theme voice, trust, and memory and by drawing on the experiences of marginalized groups in the United States. Relying on the experiences of African-Americans, Williams shows the consistent patterns of betrayal of African-Americans by privileged white citizens that give them good reason for distrusting white representatives and the institutions themselves.
Finally, representation involves mediating how groups are defined. Williams offers her understanding of representation as mediation as a supplement to what she regards as the traditional conception of liberal representation. Williams identifies two strands in liberal representation. Together, the two strands provide a coherent approach for achieving fair representation, but the traditional conception of liberal representation as made up of simply these two strands is inadequate.
In particular, Williams criticizes the traditional conception of liberal representation for failing to take into account the injustices experienced by marginalized groups in the United States.
Thus, Williams expands accounts of political representation beyond the question of institutional design and thus, in effect, challenges those who understand representation as simply a matter of formal procedures of authorization and accountability. Another way of reenvisioning representation was offered by Nadia Urbinati Urbinati argues for understanding representation as advocacy.
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For Urbinati, the point of representation should not be the aggregation of interests, but the preservation of disagreements necessary for preserving liberty. Urbinati identifies two main features of advocacy: Urbinati emphasizes the importance of the former for motivating representatives to deliberate with each other and their constituents.
For Urbinati the benefit of conceptualizing representation as advocacy is that it improves our understanding of deliberative democracy.