Vol. 3, Issue 8 – Global Taiwan Institute
Shirley A. Kan legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, , with the FY NDAA in all military contacts with China. .. involving the PRC, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines—with the latter two. Students · Current Dr. Steven Shirley, originally from the state of South Carolina, earned his BA in Over the years Dr. Shirley has lived and worked abroad, traveling and teaching in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. and foreign policy, and the Constructivist approach to International Relations. Momentum can change trends in international relations. The recent efforts by China to improve its investment environment, including by.
On April 10, Xiamen City introduced 60 measures in accordance with the 31 measures, which, among other things, set a target of offering people from Taiwan up to 5, jobs and internships each year, and allowing them to enjoy the same benefits of employment and training subsidies as the local people.
China–Japan relations - Wikipedia
The 60 measures introduced by Xiamen were divided into five major parts, which complement and enhance the 31 measures announced by the TAO, with a focus on youth, primary and secondary schools, scientific research institutes, higher education, and enterprises in order cultivate talents on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The measures include opportunities for students to: Moreover, the measures allow for the provision of medical insurance, waived fees for funeral services, subsidies for vocational training, living rent subsidies, transportation subsidies, as well as significant monetary subsidies for people with exceptional talents to work in China.
In early April, the Trump administration announced that it will levy 25 percent tariff on more than 1, imported goods from China. As Washington and Beijing raise the stakes in a potential trade war, Beijing appears to be deliberately drawing Taiwan and, in particular, its business community and youth closer into its economic orbit.
Afterageing on the island began to accelerate. At the end ofelderly people composed 12 percent of the population, and exceeded the young population in The national trend in ageing is reflected at the county and city levels, according to the Ministry of Interior. Between andthe number of aged counties and cities increased five-fold, from three to The elderly population in Chiayi County in southwestern Taiwan is the highest at Compared to other major Asian countries, the elderly population in Taiwan is second only to Japan, and comparable to South Korea.
Japan has been a super-aged society since with more than 25 percent of its population 65 years or older. That share will double to 20 percent by If the situation does not improve, the projected overall fertility rate will drop back down to 0.
This is an unsustainable drop that could have potentially devastating economic and security implications for Taiwan. On the military implications of this demographic trend, analyst Mike Mazza observed: First, with an aging and shrinking population, government tax revenues are almost certain to contract … The national budget pie is likely to shrink in the coming decades.
Licenses in the Newest Episode By: What does this starting step mean and what does it not mean? The new issuance of pending marketing licenses to allow US defense companies to discuss potential technical assistance for the IDS program is an overdue step and could have been issued a year ago without reversals.
The White House is fixing problems that obstructed credible, coordinated policymaking. As an overdue resolution of twisting and turning for a decision that could have been conveyed in a straight-forward way last year, the licenses are not timed now to provoke tension in the Taiwan Strait or in US-PRC ties.
“Taiwan’s China Dilemma” by Sharyu Shirley Lin
Initial briefings still require the licenses. Significance for Saga of Submarines In the long-term context, however, the release of the licenses is significant. The initial decision by President George W.
- Japan-China relationship is on the mend
- Vol. 3, Issue 8
- China–Japan relations
Taiwan first opted for an FMS program. Since then, despite discussions for years by legislators, other officials, and companies of the United States and Taiwan, that initial endeavor did not reach results.
Political problems obstructed progress on both sides, particularly the partisan disagreements in Taiwan. Japan has sought high-level standards of liberalization, such as substantial tariff reductions and thorough protection of intellectual property rights incorporated in the Japan-led Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Amid the trade turbulence, it is necessary for the largest trading country to demonstrate the political will to achieve higher standards of liberalization for the sake of sustainable economic growth both for it and the world.
We are entering the fourth industrial revolution. It is a hybrid industry of the digital and real economy — artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, 3-D printing, new materials and biotechnology. The nation that is most innovative and adopts emerging technologies will be the next global economic leader.
Major economies will compete to win this historic race for innovation in the coming decade. China will take advantage of its state capitalism as symbolized by its Made in China policy. Tech transfers as a condition of foreign direct investment must be rolled back.
Japan should work actively on not only China but also the U. Second is the political aspect. Some critics in China argue that U.
From the viewpoint of long-term Japanese national interests, however, its relationship with the U. Japan must always make every effort to develop stronger ties with both countries.
In this context, the Japan-U. Therefore, Japan and China need strong political will to develop their relations.
These structural shifts in cross-Strait economic relations have had important implications for Taiwan. This oscillation reflects public ambivalence toward cross-Strait relations. The public is ambivalent toward not only the general relationship between Taiwan and China, but also liberalization of cross-Strait economic policy.
Many analysts have focused on domestic factors to analyze this dilemma and the oscillation it has produced e. As elsewhere, the challenges of globalization have produced protectionist pressures in Taiwanese society. Interdependence has created winners and losers as resources are redistributed. With increases in the flow of goods, capital, and talent, social tensions over inequality and unemployment are magnified. Establishment of a fully democratic political system empowers divergent social interests to express themselves on this issue more vocally.
How countries deal with such issues depends on the size of their economy. Usually, small export-oriented countries like Taiwan cannot afford protectionism; they can ameliorate the negative consequences of globalization only through social-welfare policies and retraining programs for displaced workers.
Only rarely do smaller countries turn to restrictive foreign economic policies, because the cost is usually severely reduced growth. There are many examples of the cost of restriction to small economies, such as Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia closing off trade from the s to the s and Malaysia temporarily instituting capital controls during the Asian financial crisis.
Short-term growth inevitably slows down, as the price for somewhat greater stability and control. By contrast, larger countries can more easily engage in protectionist policies such as higher tariffs or agriculture subsidies, since they can rely on their own domestic markets for consumption and employment. As an alternative to focusing on the distributive results of liberalization, a more sociological perspective examines the evolving definition of Taiwanese identity.
Thereafter, some Taiwanese opinion leaders feared that economic interdependence with China would dilute Taiwanese identity. This certainly explains how protectionism toward China was sometimes associated with the emergence of a Taiwanese identity, but it does not answer why some advocates of a unique Taiwanese identity disagreed with restrictive economic measures and supported liberalization of cross-Strait economic policy.
Taiwan is trying to remain economically competitive yet politically autonomous as a democratic political entity, defying external pressure to integrate more deeply with China both politically and economically. Although a structuralist analysis focused on the global political economy might suggest that Taiwan can cast its economic and perhaps political lot only with China, Taiwanese society believes there is a choice to be made, and the outcome of that choice is fiercely debated.
This book offers a more inclusive approach to analyzing this debate that synthesizes structural perspectives, the politics of trade, and an analysis of identity. Even for small states, the external environment does not completely determine changes in foreign economic policy Katzenstein Furthermore, even though rationalist analyses centering on economic interests can be helpful in understanding the political consequences of the redistributive effects of economic liberalization,10 in order to fully understand foreign economic policy we need to consider how identities are constructed and how they lead to the choice of one set of policies over another Hall ; Weingast and Wittman What has been missing in analyses of cross-Strait economic policy is attention to the intensive debate on national identity and the relationship between that debate and economic policy.
Without considering the social context of shared beliefs, rationalist logic fails to explain the origins of or the priorities assigned to competing interests. This study therefore uses an eclectic analytic framework that focuses on identity as well as economic interests and treats an analysis of identity not as an alternative to other explanations but as a complementary approach that enriches them.
Identity is treated as an integral part of a more comprehensive understanding of how the Taiwanese have dealt with their China dilemma. The core argument in this more inclusive analytical framework is that identity forms the basis for defining interests.
Economic interests cannot be formed in isolation from identity. National identity is the foundation on which interests are defined and policies made. Identity serves as a guide for people to form preferences for policy outcomes. Neither identity nor normative ideas that distinguish right from wrong are centered on material interests alone Goldstein and Keohane A sense of identity provides a community with specific objectives to pursue, whether political or economic.
Are China and Japan on the road to better relations? It’s complicated | South China Morning Post
When identity is consensual, such goals are clear and can be pursued with rational considerations. But a contested sense of identity, as Taiwanese have collectively experienced until very recently, makes it difficult to agree on a stable economic policy because it produces disagreement over both national goals and the means to advance them. In sum, this study seeks to understand the evolution of cross-Strait economic policies through an examination of the relationship among national identity, economic interests, and foreign economic policy by tracing the historical processes that have led to changes in both identity and policies over two decades.
In addition to examining the domestic and international context, this approach employs discourse analysis and adds personal narratives to rationalist analyses of policy Bates et al. It examines public and elite opinion on national identity and economic policy through opinion polls and extensive interviews with officials, legislators, business leaders, journalists, representatives of interest groups, and policy analysts.
Secondary material is also used to broaden the perspective. Road Map for the Book Chapter 2 elaborates the conceptual framework that will be applied in later chapters to four episodes in the evolution of cross-Strait economic policy since Taiwan first liberalized economic relations with China. The chapter reviews relevant approaches that can be used to understand the oscillations in cross-Strait economic policies, and it introduces the eclectic analytical framework that will be employed to describe the connection between identity and policy.
Chapters 3 to 6 analyze four empirical episodes, with accompanying sectoral case studies, using this new analytical framework. Chapter 3 introduces the first episode, during which Taiwan adopted its first major change in economic policy toward China. After the missile crisis, Lee rolled out the tougher No Haste policy, formalizing the earlier restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations.Victor Gao on China-Japan relations
A National Development Conference NDC was held in in order to mobilize what appeared to be overwhelming support to adopt and implement this policy. However, a case study of the proposed investments by a major petrochemical company illustrates how the dispute over identity and policy persisted during the implementation stage.