Mind-Body Relationship | angelfirenm.info
patients in terms of both mind and body, I argue that interactive dualism which .. be a two-way causal relation between mental states and physical states. It is. ties as two distinct kinds of properties in relation to mind and body. Substance dualists claim that mind is non-physical sub- stance that does not. The Attempt of "Intensional" Logic: from the Mind-Body Relationship to the Person-Body Relationship. 3. Epistemological Characteristics of a Dual, Non- Dualistic.
The debate about the nature of the mind is relevant to the development of artificial intelligence. If the mind is indeed a thing separate from or higher than the functioning of the brain, then hypothetically it would be much more difficult to recreate within a machine, if it were possible at all.
If, on the other hand, the mind is no more than the aggregated functions of the brain, then it will be possible to create a machine with a recognisable mind though possibly only with computers much different from today'sby simple virtue of the fact that such a machine already exists in the form of the human brain. In religion[ edit ] Many religions associate spiritual qualities to the human mind.
These are often tightly connected to their mythology and ideas of afterlife. The Indian philosopher -sage Sri Aurobindo attempted to unite the Eastern and Western psychological traditions with his integral psychologyas have many philosophers and New religious movements.
Judaism teaches that "moach shalit al halev", the mind rules the heart. Humans can approach the Divine intellectually, through learning and behaving according to the Divine Will as enclothed in the Torah, and use that deep logical understanding to elicit and guide emotional arousal during prayer.
Christianity has tended to see the mind as distinct from the soul Greek nous and sometimes further distinguished from the spirit. Western esoteric traditions sometimes refer to a mental body that exists on a plane other than the physical.
Hinduism 's various philosophical schools have debated whether the human soul Sanskrit atman is distinct from, or identical to, Brahmanthe divine reality. Taoism sees the human being as contiguous with natural forces, and the mind as not separate from the body. Confucianism sees the mind, like the body, as inherently perfectible.
The arising and passing of these aggregates in the present moment is described as being influenced by five causal laws: According to Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirtithe mind has two fundamental qualities: If something is not those two qualities, it cannot validly be called mind.
You cannot have a mind — whose function is to cognize an object — existing without cognizing an object. Mind, in Buddhism, is also described as being "space-like" and "illusion-like". Mind is space-like in the sense that it is not physically obstructive. It has no qualities which would prevent it from existing. In Mahayana Buddhism, mind is illusion-like in the sense that it is empty of inherent existence.
This does not mean it does not exist, it means that it exists in a manner that is counter to our ordinary way of misperceiving how phenomena exist, according to Buddhism. When the mind is itself cognized properly, without misperceiving its mode of existence, it appears to exist like an illusion.
There is a big difference however between being "space and illusion" and being "space-like" and "illusion-like". Mind is not composed of space, it just shares some descriptive similarities to space. Mind is not an illusion, it just shares some descriptive qualities with illusions. Buddhism posits that there is no inherent, unchanging identity Inherent I, Inherent Me or phenomena Ultimate self, inherent self, Atman, Soul, Self-essence, Jiva, Ishvara, humanness essence, etc.
In other words, human beings consist of merely a body and a mind, and nothing extra. Within the body there is no part or set of parts which is — by itself or themselves — the person.
Similarly, within the mind there is no part or set of parts which are themselves "the person". A human being merely consists of five aggregates, or skandhas and nothing else.
In the same way, "mind" is what can be validly conceptually labelled onto our mere experience of clarity and knowing. As we know from the history of philosophy, the notion of mind used by the English philosopher was totally devoid of any ontological foundation, as was in general any other notion of "substance," whether material or immaterial. This reduction should be at least declared, so that it is clear to those using such theories, and, above all, provided that other methods of investigation on the same subject are not excluded.
On the contrary a reduction that "in principle" excludes the metaphysical dimension of the problem has to be judged an a priori assessment. When studying our problem, one of the major conquests obtained in this century by logic and analytical philosophy, has been the demonstration of the logic-linguistic inconsistency of any epistemologically and linguistically reductionist approach to the mind-body relationship cf.
The fundamental reason for the impossibility of this epistemological reduction has been clear since the end of the past century, thanks to the work of Franz Brentano He rediscovered the irreducibly "intentional" nature of each psychical act as such, opposed to the Kantian formalism in the treatment of the states of conscience.
We do not "just think", but, rather, we always "think perceive, want, etc. The theorists of identity hoped they could resolve the mind-body problem by proposing a presumed "synonymy" between the two modes, the "psychical" and the "neurophysiologic," to denote the same object the neural eventthat would imply the " substitutivity " of the one with the other. This substitutivity, based on the identity of the reference used that is on the equivalence of the "extension" of the termsis precisely what is forbidden in an "intentional" logic.
According to such an axiom, two classes or in a weaker form, two collections related to two distinct predicates that contain the same elements, in such a way to make equivalent the extensions of the relative predicates, represent the same class or collection. From here it follows the reciprocal substitutivity of the corresponding predicates.
Closely connected to the axiom of extensionality is the so-called "existential generalization", whose technical details we are not concerned with here. Such a procedure of generalization, however, is disastrous for the logic of those types of languages in which the axioms of "extensionality," "existential generalization," and "substitutivity for equivalence," clearly do not hold, as happens, for example, in the language of poetry, where the terms cannot be substituted with those of scientific language without compromising the meaning and the expressive value of our propositions.
All the types of logic where the three axioms mentioned above do not hold, wholly or in part, are called "intentional logics. According to this, we could also say that a proposition constructed in an intentional form is characterised by a double content: All the empiricist approaches to the mind-body problem based on the epistemological reduction of the intentional description of a psychical type to the observational description of a neurophysiological type are therefore unproved, because they suppose the substitutability of the two descriptive genres, as if both followed an extensional logic.
This groundlessness begins from the classic Humean and Kantian theory of sensation defined as "pure impression" raw feel in both systems, considered as the psychical awareness of the mechanical modification of the sense organ, thus supposing an identity between the psychical modification of the mind and the mechanical modification of the sense organ.
Mind–body problem - Wikipedia
The only theories of identity which are today epistemologically acceptable - apart from their truthfulness, which is another problem - are those so-called "substitutive of identity" theories. Such theories are based on the assumption that, in order to build a really scientific psychology, and according to the level of progress reached by the neurophysiological and cognitive sciences in terms of supplying their descriptions and explanations of given psychophysical phenomena, it is allowed to operate, wherever possible, the following substitution.
That is, to substitute an intentional "subjective" description about the psychical event with an "observational" description of the associated neurophysiological events and, at the most, with the "cognitive" description on the processing of information "implemented" in the aforesaid neurophysiological events.
The lawfulness of such substitution would depend simply on the fact that each mathematical and experimental science, particularly according to its modern meaning, is based on extensional-type logics.
The intensional logics, which are associated to the intentional reports of the psychical events, are, at most, those of the ordinary language when the latter deals with the mental events: Obviously, there is no objection to the fact that extensional and not intensional-type logics should be used in science.
However, could the extensional logics of science be considered apart from the intensional component of each language, and in particular of the natural languages? And, above all, to what extent can they do this at the level of their foundations, particularly to formally resolve their semantic problems, first of all that of reference and that of the necessity-universality of their assertions? Were it impossible to think of an absolute independence of the extensional logics from the intensional contents, as in fact it appears to be, it becomes quite unlikely that where we talk about "mind," the producer of all languages and of their logics, we could imagine a complete substitution, in the name of the extensionality of scientific languages, the contents and the constructs of intensional languages.
Here we refer to the approach of many authors, who declare that we should not literally talk about the mind-body relationship, but rather of the "subject-body" or even of the "person-body" one. This position has acquired importance thanks to the analysis of one of the best known representatives of analytical philosophy, Peter F.
Strawson, ; similar positions, though with minor differences, more or less emphasized, were also put forward by Wilkerson, ; Greene,pp. From a logical and epistemological standpoint, to establish that the problem we are dealing with is not "mind-body," but more properly "person-body," is not a trivial assertion, considering not only what we have already said regarding the point of view of the subject of the intentional acts and of his or her absolute individuality, but also considering the complementary point of view given by the analysis of his or her corporeal properties, as it had been already noticed by Moritz Schlick Schlick, Meaning and verification in "Tra realismo e neopositivismo", edited by L.
Geymonat, Bolognapp. To conclude this section, we observe that all of the cited authors -and I include also myself together with them- invite us not to metaphysically overrate the logical-epistemological approach of the anti-reductionistic type as it is here put forward.
The "duality" of "mental" and "physical" languages, and the irreducibility of their references, do not imply the "dualism" of the substances of "mind" and "body". It is not by chance that none of these authors agrees with a "dualistic" Cartesian solution to the metaphysical problem that emerges from this analysis.
On the other hand, we do not agree with those authors, such as Quine, who state that the mind-body problem, if correctly set upon these non-reductionist epistemological bases, should be exclusively a logical-epistemological one, and not also a metaphysical problem.
Such a position implies a wrong epistemological conception of metaphysics, one typical of the Modern Age. In a few words, to state that metaphysics is the "science of the being ens as such", does not mean that metaphysics is the "science of the being ens as existent existens ". The fact of reducing being to the dimension of existing alone and of its factuality is, once again, the result of an "extensionalist" reduction of the notion of being, brought into modern metaphysics by the "competition" between modern physical-mathematical sciences and their extensional languages.
The "being" described in metaphysics is not only the "extensivity of being" existentiathe "being" of the referent of a true affirmative proposition, or of the "non-being" of the referent of a true negative proposition. In other words, when we say about a certain being x that "it is an entity," or "it has being ," we are not merely saying that "it exists. The term "being" which is next to the term "is" Lat. When captured in a always partial manner by a defining-type proposition that refers to a subject as a general term denoting a collection of beings, such "essential" properties endow that same proposition with a subject-predicate reversibility i.
That is why we were not, and neither we intend to be, dualistic when, according to the initial linguistic analysis, we stated that it was correct to talk about the "mental" and the "physical" as two distinct entities, without at all implying that through this statement we were admitting or denying the existence of two distinct beings relatively to these "entities" and to their semantic fields.
These "two" distinct and irreducible entities figured as a closed polygonal line and the surface that it includes, can be very well two components of a unique "existing" psycho-physical being, the human person.
We hold that these are the theories that provide the most adequate true metaphysical solution to our problem, besides representing the solution that is most consistent with the Christian faith on the temporary immortality of the soul, and on the definitive immortality of our person risen from the deadreconstituted in its psychophysical unity.
According to his theory the soul and the body constituted two separate substances that interacted causally, and the soul represented the "driving force of the body. Republic, IV, da; Timaeus, 42ee; 69cc; 89dd; Laws, X, ed; however, this metaphor precedes Plato. In the Modern Age the dualistic theory was once again put forward in the 17th century by Descartes, and in the 20th century by Eccles. It is an automaton in the sense that it does not need any finalistic principle for the explanation of its functioning; it is "inertial" because it is based on the determinism of the principle of inertia.
The two most fundamental dilemmas of the Cartesian dualistic theory are the "logical-metaphysical" and the "physical-mathematical" problems. The French philosopher claimed that from such a demonstration he would derive self-evident information not only on the "existence" of a conscience, but also on its "nature".
The cogito proves up to a certain extent the existence of a conscience although the nature of this conscience, whether material or spiritual, individual or meta-individual, is another issue. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritateq.
From ancient Egypt and from the book of Genesis up to the time of Luigi Galvanithe interactionist doctrine attributed the transmission of the nervous impulse whose electric nature was discovered by Galvani to a sort of fluid along the nerves, reduced to microscopic capillaries. This, however, could not hold for the physical-mathematical explanation of inertial type, which Descartes proposed in his physiology for the action of corporeal spirits.
The idea that the spiritual soul would shift the direction of motion of a flow of "spirits" in the pineal gland epiphysis of the brain, in such a way to set off a "voluntary" movement of the human body, was against a fundamental principle of conservation in mechanics, directly derived from that of inertia, known as the "principle of conservation of momentum.
In any case, moving beyond any specific criticism to the Cartesian mechanism, every dualist-interactionist theory between spiritual minds and material bodies implies a violation of some kind of principle of energy conservation. In this way, such a criticism completes from a modern scientific point of view the criticism that in the Middle Ages St. Thomas had already made against Platonic interactionism in metaphysical and theological terms.
As a matter of fact, while criticizing Platonic dualism, Thomas Aquinas affirmed that if the spiritual soul is in a causal relationship with the body through the influence on the action of the corporeal spirits, then the principle of the substantial unity of the person is lost, and it becomes difficult to explain the individuality of the soul, which according to Plato can reincarnate in different bodies, a hypothesis which is considered absurd by Christian theology cf.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa TheologiaeI, q. The most fundamental contribution that John Eccles made was the attempt to provide a new solution to the physical-mathematical problem of the violation of the conservation principles that emerges in all interactionist approaches; like many other modern authors, he was convinced that the only way to support the right ethical and religious reasons for the existence of a spiritual soul was to adhere to a dualist-interactionist metaphysical vision of a Platonic-Cartesian type cf.
Eccles and Popper, ; Eccles and Robinson, Eccles believed to have found such a solution through the reference to the principles of quantum mechanicsnecessarily involved in the chemical-electrical mechanism of synapse communication. In fact, according to the principle of indetermination, we could think of an extra-physical action exerted by the mind on the synapses of the various cortical neuronal populations, without the violation of any principle of energy conservation.
There are two main objections that can be moved towards this solution, one of a biological type, and the other, more substantial, of a physical type, they both having immediate metaphysical implications. Generally speaking, most biologists agree in saying that the characteristic physical level where the vital phenomena emerge in their irreducible specificity is that of the macroscopic scale, where the organization and possibly the self-organization of complex molecular structures proteins occur, which are stable out of the thermodynamic equilibrium.
They are "dissipative structures" that self-organize and continually exchange matter-energy with the external environment, internally and externally to the body cf. Prigogine, From Being to Becoming. Stengers, Order Out of Chaos.
Man's new Dialogue with NatureLondon ; I. An Introduction, New York Yet, here we are faced with an important metaphysical consequence. If we accept that the biological and - in our case-the neurophysiological level is that of the microscopic quantum scale, given that such a level and its related uncertainty are universal for all the material structures of organic and non-organic nature, why then not brush up again the Gnostic and Neo-Platonic theories of the anima mundi type?
Then, why would not all matter be animated? His objection is that it is unfounded to endorse the suspension of the causal physical determinism on the account of the quantum uncertainty.
The quantum phenomena only show uncertainty when faced with the problem of "reduction of wave function" and to the problem of the amplified "reading" of quantum event, on a macroscopic scale, in terms of the mathematical formalism of classical mechanics that is, in terms of the functions that define one-dimensional trajectories; cf. On the other hand, the description of quantum phenomena in the microscopic terms of the appropriate mathematical formalism of the wave function is supported by experimental measures which agree with the theoretical predictions, and show no uncertainty at all, despite the temporary state of quantum electrodynamics which provides such predictions cf.
Therefore, it is not at the quantum level that we can hope to solve the scientific groundlessness found by modern authors in the dualist interactionist explanation. Theories of a Monistic View Theories of a monistic view are "metaphysically reductionist," and they still are even at present time, when they are forced to be "epistemologically non-reductionist" by logical evidence see aboveI.
These are metaphysically reductionist since they reduce one of the two terms to the "product" of a function or many functions of the other.
The history of philosophy of the second millennium brings to us two distinct types of monistic theories, spiritualist and materialist. This philosophy of nature considers the material particle in terms of an "non-extensive singularity," hence immaterial, of a "monad," in such a way that each physical body results as an aggregate of immaterial monads, all which are in the end "internal" representations of the Absolute Monad.
This theory, that was judged by Hegel as a "metaphysical novel," for us it is merely of academic interest. Here we shall dedicate more attention to the theories of materialist nature. The materialistic monism consists in the reduction of human psychical life to the product of the neurophysiological functions of the body, considered a sort of "secretion" of the neurons.
As main representatives of this anthropological teaching we can consider all the major empiricist philosophers of the Modern Age, from Hume to the contemporary positivists and neo-positivists. In the 20th century, this way of proceeding is presented in different versions.
A first version is that of the "theories of identity," already presented in Section I and which we do not need to recall again. A second version is represented by the "emergentist theories.
The term "emergence" is to be understood at a level of organization of matter that, maintaining the validity of the laws at the lower level, needs for its scientific characterisation the formulation of new laws. For example, it is evident that the laws of thermodynamics apply to all chemical systems, however it is not possible to simply derive from the laws of thermodynamics all of the chemical properties of the molecular compounds, although it is clear that in both cases the referent is always the same aggregate of molecules.
With the same type of reasoning the theory attempts to explain the emergence of the psychological facts and their laws as the emergence of a new, higher level of organization of the same physical substratum. Here, we are not far from a theory of identity: The limits of the identity theories already discussed, are the same as those of the emergentist theories.
A third version of materialistic monism is represented by the "behaviorist theories. Watsonand considered each reference to the 18th century psychology of conscience as non-scientific, in particular that of phenomenological nature. Then the behaviorist theory acquired philosophic dignity in the 's, thanks to a fundamental work by Gilbert RyleThe Concept of Mind The leading idea of this theory is the non-objectivable character of the conscious "self", intended as the "presence to my self" what I am able to render as an object to myself is only "me," however always relatively to its past states or acts and its systematic elusivity, like the present temporal moment, the "now," the nunc.
From that it derives its criticism to the "Cartesian self", intended in an objectivistic way as a "spiritual thing," and the proposal of a "dispositional behaviourism" as the characteristic object of a really scientific psychology. In other words, because of the systematic elusivity of the temporal moment, what is objectivable of behaviour is not the physiological event as such for ex.
This approach has resulted particularly prolific in scientific terms because it created on a theoretical scale a link between the old type of behaviourism belonging to the associationistic psychology of Pavlov and Watson and the computational approach typical of functionalism, and this because the notion of a "disposition to act" correspond immediately to the matrix calculus of statistical mechanics applied to the study of the cerebral dynamics.
In fact, a status that shows disposition to act can find its immediate operational equivalent in a matrix of transition probabilities, which is, in statistical mechanics, a classic algebraic instrument of calculus. Such a matrix of n 8 n elements, for each time tkdefines for each element the probability of transition from one to any other of its possible states for ex.
On a formal scale the "neural networks" are nothing more than very evolved, and sometimes very complex, versions of this basic idea. At the beginning of the 's Hilary Putnam born inwith his famous work Minds and Machineslaunched the research program of "functionalism," having the intention to solve the mind-body problem in terms of the software-hardware relationship of a computer. Such an approach, which is today completely repudiated by its initiator, had the intention to re-propose on a new basis the classical rationalist theory of the mind.
Putnam did so in the light of the notion of "cognitive unconscious" taken from the psychology of intelligence elaborated by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piagetwho identified the intelligence with the development of logical-formal operational schemes and their unconscious use by the subject cf.
Piaget, Logic and Psychology, ; J. Putnam's second pillar was the development of a theory of computability starting from the mathematical interpretation of formal logic and the notion of propositional function operated by Gottlob Fregewhich had experienced two futher steps.
Therefore, the UTM constitutes the logical scheme of a modern multi-programmable calculator. The link with the field of behaviourism was derived by a further demonstration obtained by W.
Pitt inthat guaranteed the equivalence between the algebraic matrix calculation of a simply interconnected network of neurons and the calculations which were executable by a TM. From here followed, in the 's, the development of the two main features of functionalism, that ultimately led to the so-called "strong version" of the research programme of Artificial Intelligence AI: It appears therefore totally insufficient in accounting for the intentionality and the intensional logic referring to the "contents" cf.
For this reason, in the functionalist approach of "strong" AI, it is necessary to rely on an "oracle", according to the expression coined by Turing himself, a figure of unquestionable universal intelligence that is able to produce its responses of truth and coherence without conceding any possible control on its action. Hofstadter comes to this conclusion and ascribes in a neo-Spinozian way the metalogic function of "universal intelligence," of "oracle," to the non-computable determinism of the matter as a whole, matter of which also the brain of a single individual is part of, a determinism that appears "inviolable" towards the necessarily partial self-referentiality of the cerebral computations of a single brain.
In such a way, functionalism reveals its "double monist" nature for a theory of mind-body relationship. It is monist not only because it denies the "immaterial" dimension of intelligence, but also, and above all, because it denies the existence of "individual" intelligences which produce thoughts and are capable to act freely.
That is, it denies the metaphysical foundations of the notion of person. From a metaphysical point of view, functionalism appears as a re-proposal of the rationalist theories of the mind that deny to the single individual the capacity to think "with his or her own head," as was proposed already in the Middle Ages by the theories of the Arabian rationalist aristotelism of Avicenna and Averroes, in the Modern Age by the theories of Spinoza and Hegel, and in the contemporary ages by the doctrine of Husserl and his meta-individual "phenomenologic Self.
On the other hand the approach of the cognitive sciences to the study of the mind and of the mind-body relationship can also be interpreted according to a "dual" type of metaphysical scheme, provided a renunciation of its original functionalist character.
However, before examining the dual theories, it is necessary to make a brief consideration about the intrinsic limitations of the functionalist approach, or theory of the "strong" AI, that leads its authors to the "oracle solution" and brings them to the above mentioned twofold monist outcome. It is clear that in the functionalist approach each human mind corresponds to a UTM, given the capacity the human mind has for a universal thought.
Now, the incapacity of a UTM "to have the knowledge of not knowing" depends upon the famous theorem of limitation which is intrinsic to the Universal Turing Machine computations. This machine has the capacity to simulate the calculations of all the single TM, in such a way to confer universality to their computations, but has the limitation of not being able to decide when its calculations have reached a satisfactory outcome and have to stop consequently.
In particular, the UTM cannot find a decisive computational procedure, through which "to assert" in its arithmetic meta-language that a certain datum expressed in its arithmetic language is "false. Human intelligence is capable of correcting itself, of progress and development, unlike animal intelligence, precisely because of its ability to notice its own errors.
Basti and Perrone,pp. From a point of view that takes into account the history of logic, to overcome the mentioned limits of the formal calculus would mean, at the same time, overcoming the limits of the axiomatic method itself, as if it were the "only" method in modern logic, and to recover the richness of the pre-modern analytical method, characteristic of Platonic, Aristotelian and Scholastic logic: In a word, to perform these operations would mean to render scientific dignity to the "logic of discovery" against the modern absolutism of the "logic of proof" and of its axiomatic method cf.
Dual Theories of interpreting the Mind-Body Relationship When speaking of "dual" theories we mean all those theories of the mind-body relationship that: In such way the mind-body relationship is interpreted according to the Aristotelian "hylemorphic" metaphysical scheme of the form-matter relationship Gr. According to the version given by Scholastic anthropology, the spiritual soul is the form of matter, and "form" and "matter", substantially united, constitute the living human body, the only personal substance of a human being and of that "unique" human being, capable of vital vegetative operations metabolism, growth, reproductionand of sensory-motor and intellectual functions for a review on the principles of the Aristotelian-Thomistic biology, cf.
With respect to the monist and dualist theories, the "dual" theories have three main characteristics: These characteristics especially the third are strongly present in the medieval thought of Thomas Aquinas, who made the choice to re-evaluate the Aristotelian hylemorphic approach in anthropology -not without operating a profound revision of its metaphysical basis.
He noticed that, besides an intrinsic superior coherence, such an approach could grant a great consistency with the principles of Christian anthropology, more than that shown by the Platonic dualist approach, especially for what concerned the person, its irreducible individuality and its intrinsic psychophysical unity.
Many contemporary authors who operate today in the field of cognitive sciences intend to refer to a dual-type, and not to a monist-type metaphysical paradigm, even though only a few of them, in the recent past, were clearly aware that such metaphysical paradigm was not compatible with the functionalist approach of the cognitive sciences cf.
The localization of the Mind. The mind or, in the Scholastic, Greek-Platonic terminology, the "soul" is indeed a non-material "thing," as Descartes would have liked, however it is not a "substance" that is complete in its being in the way it is stated by the dualist theories. It is the formal principle of unity of a stratified whole of material parts today we would say: It is rather a non-material or "formal" component of a substance made of material parts that experience constant modification.
Where the notion of "form" is understood according to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, as a constantly adapting plastic whole of relationships of disposition of dynamic material parts, continually modifying and interacting among themselves and with the external world. An example of it, is given, at the cellular level, by the metabolic physical-chemical activity of the cell itself. In this context the "mind," according to the dual theories, has a unique location with respect to the body, which the mind itself organizes.
Instead of being located "in the body" and at the most "in the head", as in all of the dualist theories Plato assigned its location to the attachment point of the neural cord with the cerebellum, Descartes in the "pineal gland" epiphysisEccles in the synapses of the populations of neurons in the cerebral cortexand in the ancient and modern monist theories, an illustrative solution that M.
Schlick defined "principle of introjection", the dual theories rather affirm that "it is the mind that contains the body.
In a book which is strongly and justly critical towards the functionalist approach to the cognitive sciences, Penrose expresses himself on the matter: It is not all unreasonable to suppose that the persistence of the 'self' might have more to do with the preservation of patterns than of actual material particles" Penrose,pp.
Here is instead what was stated on the same argument by Donald M.Relationship Between Body and Mind
MacKayone of the founders of the non-functionalistic approach to the cognitive sciences, to whom, amongst other things, we must acknowledge the definition of "dual theories" applied to this particular type of theories of the mind: Mental activity would be meaningfully locatable in principle in specific flow-structures of the information-diagram; but this meant that the relevant flow-lines would in general extend beyond the confines of any one component structure, and during conscious action might even run out-and-back through the environment.
Mentality, as a system-property, could be rendered invisible or destroyed by attempts to localize its action to any subsystem of the total information-flow pattern in which it was currently embodied" MacKay,p. More recently, the same idea that the mind is embodied within the informational flow schemes, internal and external to the body, received support from A. It stands as the new post-functionalist paradigm in the cognitive sciences, one that tries to unite different elements, albeit not without some confusion.
Regarding the localization of the mind or of the "rational soul" of the human being with respect to its body, in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas held a position that was very similar to that of the modern supporters of the dual theory.
He said precisely that non-material entities, such as the soul, can be localized with respect to the matter that they control and organize, not through a relationship of contact between the external surfaces of a body "that contains" and those of one that is "contained," as it takes place between material entities. Non-material entities, rather, must be localized through "the extension of the capacity to control and organize Lat.
For Aquinas the attempt to localize the soul and its action in specific parts of the brain, such as that brought forward at his times by the interactionism of the Platonists, is totally wrong and misleading cf.
Summa TheologiaeI, q. Resorting to this same principle, he justified the omnipresence of God in the universe, for His actual capacity to govern everything and not just a body as in the case of the human soul in each one of us. A second characteristic of the dual metaphysical theory of the mind, immediately linked to the original localization of the mind with respect to the body in the theory itself, is that it appears connected to an "intentional" theory of knowledge, as much as the other two types of theories are, at least in modern times, dependent upon an exclusively "representational" theory representationism of knowledge.
How the history of modern philosophy teaches us, the emergence of a representational theory of knowledge is nothing more than the epistemological counterpart of the progressive establishment of the absolutization of the axiomatic method in modern mathematics and logic, that identifies in the theory of demonstration and proof the only object of logic as science and as organon of the mathematical and natural sciences.
So much the questioning about the truth and the foundation of axioms is well far beyond the interest and the capacity of the axiomatic method, how much, in a similar way, does the questioning about the "thinking thought" the intellectus for the thinkers of the medieval period that formulates ideas and produces logical symbols in a truthful relationship with the object, with respect to the representational theory of knowledge.
A questioning, that on the thinking thought, which limits itself just to the analysis of the "thought which is thought," the thought that manipulates symbols which are already constituted according to logical and formal rules the ratio in medieval terms. This got to a point in the 19th century when a project was conceived to reduce epistemology and logic to a unique "universal algebra" of thought, reduced to a pure syntactic formalism occupied with the manipulation of graphical "signs", no longer without a symbolic semantic value.
The building of a TM is probably the higher expression of the formalist approach to logic and epistemology, but for this very reason it indicates, at the same time, the beginning of an unstoppable decline. It is certainly not due to mere chance that the principle of intentionality came to acquire an ever greater relevance in the contemporary epistemological and logical-foundational debate, as it became increasingly evident that there was on the one hand a failure in the formalist approach to the foundations of logics and mathematics, and, on the other, the insufficiency of the functionalist interpretation in the cognitive sciences.
In the 13th century, when Thomas Aquinas had to face these problems as a philosopher and a theologian, he was in a very similar situation to ours. In a particular way, in the last part of his life, Aquinas, in Paris, had to face up to that "lay" interpretation of the Latin Averroism of Siger of Brabant ca.
As an answer to these theories Aquinas proposed his own interpretation of the Aristotelian rational soul as form of the body.
In so doing, he wished to obtain two main results: